The paper is concerned with Stackelberg solutions for a differential game with deterministic dynamics but random initial data, where the leading player can adopt a strategy in feedback form: u 1 = u 1 (t, x). The first main result provides the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium solution, assuming that the family of feedback controls u 1 (t, ·) available to the leading player are constrained to a finite dimensional space. A second theorem provides necessary conditions for the optimality of a feedback strategy. Finally, in the case where the feedback u 1 is allowed to be an arbitrary function, an example illustrates a wide class of systems where the minimal cost for the leading player corresponds to an impulsive dynamics. In this case, a Stackelberg equilibrium solution does not exists, but a minimizing sequence of strategies can be described.
Introduction
Consider a differential game for two players. Let x ∈ IR n describe the state of a system, which evolves according to the differential equatioṅ x(t) = f t, x(t), u 1 (t), u 2 (t) (1.1) with initial condition
Here the upper dot denotes a derivative w.r.t. time. The functions u 1 (·), u 2 (·) are the controls implemented by the two players, taking values inside admissible sets U 1 , U 2 ⊆ IR m , respectively. For i = 1, 2, the goal of the i-th player is to minimize his own cost, given by
According to the definition of Stackelberg equilibrium [4, 6, 12] , we assume that Player 1 (the leader) announces his feedback strategy in advance, say u 1 = u 1 (t, x). Given the initial point x, Player 2 (the follower) then chooses his strategy u 2 = u 2 (t; u 1 ,x) in order to minimize his own cost J 2 .
We remark that, in a standard control problem, an optimal feedback control yields the minimum cost in connection with every initial datax. However, this important property cannot be achieved for a Stackelberg solution to a differential game. Namely, the optimal feedback strategy for the leading player usually depends heavily on the initial data [16, 18] . To obtain a meaningful mathematical problem, in connection with a large set of initial data, in this paper we shall thus consider a probability distribution µ on the set of initial datax ∈ IR n . Definition 1. Given a feedback control u 1 = u 1 (t, x) for the first player and an initial datā x ∈ IR n , we define R 2 (u 1 ,x) as the set of best replies for Player 2. These are the controls u 2 : [0, T ] → IR m which yield the minimum cost for the optimization problem minimize:
T 0 L 2 t, x(t), u 1 (t, x(t)), u 2 (t) dt , (1.4) subject to:ẋ = f (t, x(t), u 1 (t, x(t)), u 2 (t)) , x(0) =x .
(1.5)
In the following, given a probability measure µ on the set of initial data, we denote by E µ the expected value of a quantity depending onx.
Definition 2. Let F be a family of admissible feedback functions. A feedback u * 1 ∈ F is an optimal strategy for the leading player if for µ-a.e. initial datax one can choose a best reply u 2 (·; u * 1 ,x) ∈ R 2 (u * 1 ,x) in such a way that for every other feedback u 1 ∈ F and any selection of best replies u 2 (· ; u 1 ,x) ∈ R 2 (u 1 ,x).
Remark 1.
In this model, Player 1 announces his feedback strategy in advance, before knowing the exact value of the initial data. His strategy must therefore seek a best possible expected value for the payoff. The expectation being w.r.t. the probability measure µ.
On the other hand, we assume that Player 2 chooses his strategy with full information about (i) the leader's strategy u * 1 and (ii) the initial conditionx. His choice will thus be a best reply, as described in Definition 1. In the case where Player 2 has several best replies all yielding the same minimum cost, we are here assuming that he choses the one most favorable to Player 1.
In Section 2 we assume that, for each t ∈ [0, T ], the feedback u 1 (t, ·) depends on a finite set of parameters. For example, u 1 (t, ·) is a polynomial in x, or a piecewise affine function. Under natural convexity hypotheses on the cost functions L 1 , L 2 , our first main result provides the existence of an optimal strategy for the leading player. Section 3 is devoted to necessary conditions for the optimality of a strategy of the leading player. As it is well known in the literature, one here encounters a fundamental difficulty. Namely, replies of the second player that satisfy the Pontryagin necessary conditions are not necessarily optimal. It thus makes sense to consider a wider set of "weakly optimal replies". Definition 3. Given a feedback control u 1 = u 1 (t, x) for the first player and an initial datā x ∈ IR n , we call R w 2 (u 1 ,x) the set of weakly optimal replies for Player 2. These are the controls u * 2 : [0, T ] → IR m which satisfy the Pontryagin necessary conditions for optimality:
Throughout the following, we say that a feedback u * ∈ F is a weakly optimal strategy for Player 1 if it satisfies Definition 2, with R 2 (u * ,x) replaced by R w 2 (u * ,x).
Remark 2. Clearly, the above definitions are meaningful only if the feedback u * 1 is sufficiently regular so that the evolution equations (1.8) are well defined and have at least a solution for µ-a.e. initial datax. If this solution is unique, then
Remark 3. In general, a weakly optimal strategy u * ∈ F for Player 1 need not be optimal, and an optimal strategy need not be weakly optimal. The two definitions clearly coincide under the assumption that R 2 (u 1 ,x) = R w 2 (u 1 ,x) for every admissible control u 1 and µ-a.e. initial datax. In particular this is true if, for every u 1 ,x, the Pontryagin equations (1.7)-(1.9) have a unique solution.
Toward the derivation of necessary optimality conditions for the Player 1, the usefulness of this concept of weakly optimal strategy becomes clear. We sketch here the main approach.
Motivated by (1.7), for every t, x, u 1 , ξ, define the control value
In the following, we assume that the above minimum is attained at a unique point u 2 , contained in the interior of U 2 . This is certainly the case under the assumptions
is strictly convex and has superlinear growth:
The optimization problem for the leading player can now be written as follows.
Minimize:
for a solution to the boundary value problem
(1.13)
In (1.13) it is understood that the right hand sides of the differential equations are computed at the point t, x, u 1 (t, x), u 2 (t, x, u 1 (t, x), ξ) .
Due to the presence of u 1,x on the right hand side of the evolution equation (1.13), the problem of minimizing the expected cost (1.12) is non-standard. In the case where both x and ξ are assigned at the initial time t = 0 has been recently studied in [8] . See also [9] for specific examples. As anticipated in [18] , if the values u 1 (t, x) of the feedback can be freely assigned, in most cases this leads to an ill posed system of equations.
As observed in [9] , the term u 1,x can often be considered as an additional component of the control, which can be chosen arbitrarily large and comes with no cost. In such cases, the optimal strategy for the leading player would correspond to an impulsive dynamics and can never be exactly attained.
To illustrate this point, Section 4 exhibits a class of nonlinear systems where a minimizing sequence of feedback controls u 1,ν is explicitly constructed, but the infimum cost for the leading player cannot be attained. Roughly speaking, in these cases there is an optimal state x † and an optimal control value u † 1 which minimize the running cost L 1 = L 1 (x, u 1 ) for Player 1. For any ε > 0 and anyx within a bounded set of initial data, the leading player can force Player 2 to keep the system at the state x † for all times t ∈ [ε, T − ε]. This is achieved by introducing suitable penalties whenever x(t) = x † . As it is often the case for Stackelberg equilibria, these penalties (which would be very costly also to Player 1) are never implemented, because it is not optimal for Player 2 to deviate from the path imposed by the leader.
It is interesting to compare Stackelberg solutions with Nash non-cooperative solutions to differential games. Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form can be studied by looking at the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations describing the value functions for the two players. As shown in [6, 7] , in more than one space dimension this system of equations is generically not hyperbolic. Hence the backward Cauchy problem describing the Nash solutions is ill posed. For Stackelberg solutions, the non-existence of feedback solutions described in Section 4 has a quite different motivation. Namely, the trajectory of the system which is optimal for Player 1 has impulsive nature, and can be achieved only with an infinite cost to Player 2. No matter what threats he implements, the leader can only attain an approximation to this optimal trajectory.
An introduction to the basic concepts of differential games can be found in [4, 6, 12] . See [16, 14, 17, 18, 19] for related result on Stackelberg equilibria. A differential game with random initial data was studied in [10] . Alternative concepts of solutions to a differential game, involving partial cooperation, were considered in [7, 15, 20] . For the basic theory of optimal control problems and we refer to [3, 5, 11, 13] . Patchy feedbacks, used in Section 4, were introduced in [1] . See [2, 5] for a survey.
Existence of an optimal feedback control
In this section we study the existence of an optimal strategy for the leading player, within a family of feedback strategies depending on finitely many parameters. We thus consider the systemẋ
assuming that the feedback control u 1 (t, x) for the leading player has the form
Here ψ 1 , . . . , ψ N are smooth functions of x, while v 1 , . . . , v N are measurable functions of time.
In practice, this assumption can be justified by observing that any continuous map u = u(t, x) can be approximated by functions of the form (2.2) uniformly on compact sets.
In the following, we assume that
where U 1 is a compact convex set in IR N . After the leading player has announced his feedback control u 1 (t, x) as in (2.2), and given an initial data
the second player seeks to minimize his expected cost
The minimization takes place over all measurable controls
For a given control t → v(t) for the leading player, we call R 2 (v,x) the (possibly empty) family of best replies t → u 2 (t) ∈ U 2 for the second player. Our present goal is to provide conditions on f and on the cost functionals L 1 , L 2 which guarantee the existence of a feedback u 1 for the leading player which is optimal w.r.t. a family of initial data. More precisely, given a probability distribution µ on the set of initial datax in (2.4), we seek an admissible control t → v * (t) ∈ U 1 and a selection of optimal repliesx → u * 2 (·,x) ∈ R 2 (v * ,x) such that
achieves the global minimum. Here the minimum is sought among all measurable functions v : [0, T ] → U 1 , and among all selectionsx → u 2 (·,x) ∈ R 2 (v,x) of optimal replies.
Consider the following assumptions.
(H1) The cost functions L 1 , L 2 are non-negative and continuous w.r.t. all arguments. The function f is continuous in all variables, continuously differentiable w.r.t. x, and satisfies the bound
and for all u 1 as in (2.2), with v ∈ U 1 .
(H2) For every t, x, the function f (t, x, u 1 , u 2 ) is affine w.r.t. the variables u 1 , u 2 . The cost function L 1 is convex w.r.t. the variables u 1 , u 2 . Finally, the cost function L 2 has the form
with L 22 convex in the variable u 2 .
(H3) The set of admissible control values U 1 , U 2 are compact, convex.
Under the above assumptions, our main theorem provides the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium solution.
Theorem 1. Let the assumptions (H1)-(H3) hold, and let µ be a probability measure on the set of initial data. Assume that the leading player has at least one strategy v(·) with finite expected cost. Then the differential game with dynamics (1.1) and cost functionals (1.3) admits a Stackelberg equilibrium solution, among all feedback controls for the leading player having of the form (2.2).
Proof. 1. Let t → v(t) ∈ U 1 be any measurable control for the leading player, yielding the feedback u 1 = u 1 (t, x) in (2.2). Under the assumption (H1)-(H3) it is well known that, for every initial datax, the set of optimal replies u 2 (·,x) is non-empty and weakly closed. See for example [11] , or Chapter 5 in [5] for details. More precisely, if u 2,ν : [0, T ] → U 2 is a minimizing sequence of control functions for Player 2, and
This proves that, for every fixed initial datax, the set of best replies R 2 (v,x) is non-empty. A similar argument shows that, within this family of best replies, we can choose one that minimizes the cost to Player 1. Indeed, assume that u 2,ν ∈ R 2 (v,x) for every ν ≥ 1 and
Extracting a subsequence, we can achieve the weak convergence u 2,ν u * 2 and the uniform convergence x ν → x * . The convexity of L 1 w.r.t. u 2 now yields
(2.11) We conclude that, given a control v for the first player, for eachx there exists a best reply u * 2 (·) ∈ R 2 (v,x) which is optimal for Player 1 (restricted to the set of best replies).
2. In this step we establish a lower semicontinuity property of the map (v,x) → m 1 (v,x) defined at (2.10). Namely, consider a converging sequence of initial pointsx k →x, and a weakly convergent sequence of controls for the leading player:
Indeed, consider any control t → u 2 (t) ∈ U 2 for the second player, and call x , x k respectively the solutions ofẋ
By the weak convergence v k → v and by the linearity of f w.r.t. u 1 , u 2 , we have the convergence
This proves our claim.
As a consequence, given a sequence (v k ,x k ) such that v k v andx k →x, we have
In particular, for a given control v(·) the mapx → m 1 (v,x) is lower semicontinuous, hence measurable. Therefore, for any probability measure µ on the set of initial data, the integral
is well defined (possibly taking the value +∞).
3. Next, consider a minimizing sequence of controls v k (·) for Player 1, so that
(2.14)
By possibly extracting a subsequence and reabeling, we can assume the weak convergence
. We claim that v * is an optimal strategy for Player 1. Indeed, all functionsx → m 1 (v k ,x) are non-negative and lower semicontinuous. By (2.12) and Fatou's lemma,
Necessary conditions for optimality
By the analysis at (1.12)-(1.13), a weakly optimal strategy u * 1 (t, x) for the leading player must be optimal for the following problem.
subject to:
Here x, ξ ∈ IR n . Moreover, with slight abuse of notation, we rename
with u given at (1.10). Finally,
where f and L 2 are evaluated at the point (t, x, u, u 2 (t, x, u, ξ)). We regard (3.1)-(3.2) as a problem of optimal control on the infinite dimensional space whose elements are couples of functions (x, ξ) : IR n → IR n × IR n , depending on the initial pointx ∈ IR n . The infimum is sought over all measurable control functions u : [0, T ] → U, where U is a family of admissible functions ω : IR n → IR m , sufficiently regular so that the corresponding evolution of the variables x, ξ in (3.2) is well defined. For example, we can impose that for each fixed t the function u(t, ·) be affine. In this case, U would be the family of all polynomial functions of degree one in the variables x 1 , . . . , x n . Another natural choice is to take U as the family of all C 2 functions of the variable x.
In the following, we seek necessary conditions for optimality of an admissible control u * : [0, T ] → U, for the problem (3.1)-(3.2). After a renaming of variables, these immediately yield necessary conditions for the weak optimality of a feedback control u 1 = u * 1 (t, x) for the Stackelberg game.
Given a control u = u(t, x), consider a family of perturbed solutions of (3.2) having the form
(3.5)
Linearizing (3.2) around the reference trajectory t → (x(t,x), ξ(t,x)), we obtain a linear equation for the first order perturbations X, Z, namely
with boundary conditions
Next, for each fixedx ∈ IR n , let the couple of functions (P, Q) : [0, T ] → IR n × IR n provide a solution to the dual system
By construction, for any solution X Z of (3.6) and any solution P Q of (3.9), integrating w.r.t. the measure µ one obtains
In the following discussion, we shall always assume that the functions f, g, L satisfy the following assumptions.
(A1) The functions f, g, L are continuous in all variables, and continuously differentiable w.r.t. x, ξ, u, v.
(A2) Every admissible feedback control ω(·) ∈ U is twice continuously differentiable.
(A3) The probability measure µ has compact support.
In the following, given initial data (x,ξ), we denote by t → x(t;x,ξ) the solution to the evolution equations in (3.2) with initial data
Moreover, we callξ(x) = ξ(0) the initial value for ξ of the solution to the boundary value problem (3.2).
Theorem 2 (necessary conditions for optimality). Let the above assumptions (A1)-(A3)
hold. Let u = u(t, x) be an optimal feedback control for the problem (3.1)-(3.2), piecewise continuous w.r.t. time, which is admissible in the sense that u(t, ·) ∈ U for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Call x(t,x), ξ(t,x) the corresponding trajectories, which we assume remain uniformly bounded asx ranges in the support of µ. Let the couple of dual functions (P, Q) : [0, T ]×IR → IR n ×IR n provide a solution to (3.8)-(3.9) and assume that the n × n Jacobian matrix
is invertible, for allx in the support of µ andξ =ξ(x).
Then, for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], the feedback control u(t, ·) ∈ U provides a global minimizer to the functional
(3.12)
within the family of all admissible control functions ω(·) ∈ U.
Proof. 1. Assume that, for some τ ∈ ]0, T ] where u is continuous, the feedback u(τ, ·) does not satisfy the above minimality condition. Then there exists an admissible control function ω :
Consider the family of "needle variations" of u, defined as
We claim that, for ε > 0 sufficiently small,
, contradicting the optimality of u.
2. We claim that, for all ε ∈ ]0, ε 0 ] sufficiently small and every initial datax in the support of µ, a solution x ε (t,x), ξ ε (t,x) of (3.2) corresponding to the control u ε does exist.
Indeed, consider the map
where ξ(T ) is the terminal value of the solution to the Cauchy problem 15) with initial data
For anyx in the support of the probability measure µ, when ε = 0 andξ =ξ(x), by assumption we have ξ(T ) = 0. Using the transversality assumption (3.11) and the implicit function theorem, we obtain a neighborhood Nx ofx and εx > 0 with the following property. For all ε ∈ [0, εx] and every initial pointȳ ∈ Nx there exists an initial valueξ =ξ ε (ȳ) such that the corresponding solution of (3.15) with initial data
satisfies ξ(T ) = 0. Since the support of µ is bounded, hence compact, it can be covered with finitely many neighborhoods Nx i , i = 1, . . . , κ. Choosing
our claim is proved.
3.
We now estimate the difference in the costs:
For t < τ − ε, the first order perturbations X(t,x), Z(t,x) in (3.5) satisfy (3.6), (3.10) . Moreover, at the time t = τ where the needle variation in the control takes place, we have
Differentiating the total cost w.r.t. ε at ε = 0+, and using (3.10), the boundary conditions (3.7) and (3.9) to eliminate boundary terms, and finally (3.17)-(3.18), we obtain
19) because of the assumption (3.13). This shows that, for ε > 0 small, the feedback control u ε in (3.14) achieves a lower cost, contradicting the assumption that u is optimal.
In the case where g does not depend on u x , the minimizer of the functional J(t, ω(·)) can be constructed pointwise, for each givenx ∈ IR n . The dependence on the first derivative u x makes the problem "non-classical".
As stated in Theorem 2, the necessary conditions are hard to implement, because at each time τ the optimization has to be carried out w.r.t. a probability measure µ given on the set of initial data, rather than on the probability distribution of the state at time τ . Following [1, 2] , in the one-dimensional case one can write these equations in a more appealing form.
We begin by representing the probability measure µ as the push-forward of Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] by a nondecreasing map y →x(y). This map is defined by the property
Denoting by x(t, y), ξ(t, y) the solution of (3.2) with boundary data
the expected cost in (3.1) can be rewritten as
Assume that the map y → x(t, y) is strictly increasing, for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Observe that the map φ(t, y) . = [x y (t, y)] −1 can then be obtained as the solution to
If U is the family of all C 2 control functions and u is an optimal feedback control satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 2, then at a.e. time τ ∈ [0, T ] the map u(τ, ·) should be a global minimizer for (3.12) . Replacing an integration w.r.t. the probability measure µ with an integration w.r.t. y ∈ [0, 1], we find that the function u(t, y) = u(t, x(t, y)) must satisfy
for every function w ∈ C 2 ([0, 1]) which vanishes at y = 0 and at y = 1. Notice that in (3.21) one of the terms was integrated by parts, using the identity w x = φ(t, y)w y . Since w is arbitrary, the above necessary conditions yield
At a given time t, it is understood that the left hand side of (3.22) should be computed at the point t, x(t, y), ξ(t, y), u(t, x(t, y) , for any y ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, by (3.2), (3.9), and choosing a perturbation w which does not vanish on the boundary, we obtain the following boundary conditions:
4 Nonexistence of optimal feedback strategies Aim of this section is to exhibit a class of differential games where no optimal feedback control for the leading player exists, if this feedback is allowed to range over the family of all piecewise constant functions of t, x.
Consider a scalar system which is linear w.r.t. the control variableṡ where f 0 , f 1 , f 2 are C 1 functions such that
for some constant C > 0 and every x ∈ IR. Let the cost functions for the two players have the form
for some constants α, β > 0. Let x 1 ,ū 1 be the global minimizer for L 1 (x, u 1 ). Without loss of generality we can assume thatx 1 = 0,ū 1 = 0, and
Under these assumptions we claim that, for anyη and ε > 0, the leading player can implement a piecewise constant "patchy" feedback u 1 = u 1 (t, x) such that, for every initial datax ∈ [−η,η] and any best reply u 2 (·; u 1 ,x) of Player 2, its cost is ≤ ε. As a consequence, if µ is any probability measure with bounded support, for any ε > 0 there exists a patchy feedback u 1 for the leading player which yields an expected cost ≤ ε.
Let C 1 > 0 be a constant such that
Letη be given. It is clearly not restrictive to assumē
The feedback u 1 is constructed as follows. Define the continuous function η : [0, T ] → IR by setting (see Fig. 4 )
(4.8)
Since we are assuming that L 1 (0, 0) = 0, we can choose the constant δ > 0 small enough so that
and moreover
for every trajectory x(·) such that
Consider a feedback u 1 for the leading player having the form
We claim that, if the constant K is chosen large enough, then for every initial pointx ∈ [−η,η], the best reply u 2 (·; u 1 ,x) of Player 2 yields a trajectory satisfying (4.11). Hence (4.10) holds.
Observe that, by (4.2), Player 2 can steer the system along any absolutely continuous path x(·). Indeed, given x(·), his control function is determined by
In particular, if x(t) = η(t), then the corresponding control u
We can now find constants C 1 , C 2 , not depending of K, such that
Next, assume that the trajectory x(·) does not satisfy (4.11). To fix the ideas, we assume x(t) > η(t) at some time t. If x(t) < −η(t), the analysis is entirely similar. Three cases will be considered, illustrated by the paths γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 in Fig. 4 .
We claim that the trajectoryx
yields a strictly lower cost to Player 2. Indeed, by (4.13) one has
then by (4.15) 19) This shows that the trajectory (4.16) yields a strictly lower cost to Player 2, as claimed.
Case 2: x(t) > η(t) for t ∈ ]t 1 , T ] with t 1 < T − δ and x(t 1 ) = η(t 1 ) = 0. Again, we claim that the trajectory (4.16) yields a lower cost to Player 2.
By (4.1) and (4.12) it follows x(t) = x(t 1 ) +
In turn, this implies Comparing the second player's costs for the trajectories x andx in (4.16), if the constant K was chosen so that
we then obtain
proving our claim.
Case 3: x(t) > η(t) for t ∈ ]t 1 , T ] with t 1 ≥ T − δ and x(t 1 ) = η(t 1 ).
Observe that it is not restrictive to assume that |x(t)| ≤ η(t) for all t ∈ [0, t 1 ]. Otherwise, as proved in Case 1, the control u 2 for Player 2 would not be optimal. In particular, this assumption implies x(T − δ) = 0. Consider the alternative control function Recalling that x(T − δ) = 0, we obtain x(t 1 ) = η(t 1 ) = t 1 + δ − T δη = 
Once again, this shows that the control u 2 does not yield the minimum cost to Player 2.
The previous analysis has shown that, for every ε > 0 and every compact set I of initial states, the leading player can design a feedback achieving a cost ≤ ε for every initial pointx ∈ I. Clearly, there is no measurable feedback that can yield exactly zero cost. Hence in this setting no optimal feedback can exist.
